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Abstract It has recently been shown that the cost asso-
ciated with switching tasks is eliminated following ‘no-go’
trials, in which response selection is not completed, sug-
gesting that the switch cost depends on response selection.
However, no-go trials may also affect switch costs by
interfering with the effects of task preparation that precede
response selection. To test this hypothesis we evaluated
switch costs following standard go trials with those
following two types of non-response trials: no-go trials, for
which a stimulus is presented that indicates no response
should be made (Experiment 1); and cue-only trials in
which no stimulus is presented following the task cue
(Experiment 2). We hypothesized that eliminating no-go
stimuli would reveal effects of task preparation on the
switch cost in cue-only trials. We found no switch cost
following no-go trials (Experiment 1), but a reliable switch
cost in cue-only trials (i.e., when no-go stimuli were
removed; Experiment 2). We conclude that no-go trials can
modulate the switch cost, independent of their effect on
response selection, by interfering with task preparation,
and that the effects of task preparation on switch cost are
more directly assessed by cue-only trials.
Introduction
In task-switching paradigms participants shift between task
rules (e.g., ‘‘Is a number greater or lesser than ﬁve?’’, ‘‘Is a
number odd or even?’’) for the same set of stimuli (e.g.,
digits 1 through 9). The comparison of trials on which task
rules switch with those on which task rules repeat is
valuable for investigating those processes that are associ-
ated with behavioral control, presumed to be particularly
important during task-rule switches. Indeed a difference in
performance is typically observed between switch and
repeat trials. This switch cost has been associated with at
least two critical processes of behavioral control: task
preparation and response selection.
Task preparation is hypothesized to involve at least
partial retrieval of task rules (Allport & Wylie, 1999;d e
Jong, 2000; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Mayr & Kliegl,
2000; Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 1996; Rubinstein, Meyer &
Evans, 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Yeung & Monsell,
2003), referred to as task set reconﬁguration (Rogers &
Monsell, 1995). This process can be triggered by a cue that
indicates the identity (Sohn & Carlson, 2000) or probability
(Dreisbach, Haider & Kluwe, 2002) of a subsequent task.
Evidence for task preparation comes from the observation
that the more information and preparatory time that par-
ticipants are granted before a task, the better their perfor-
mance. The beneﬁt of preparation for performance is
measured as a function of the cue–stimulus interval (CSI).
An increase in its duration produces a reduction in switch
cost (RISC; Meiran, 1996; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). More
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also contributes to RISC (Logan & Schneider, 2006). In
either case, advance cuing appears to prospectively beneﬁt
performance during task switching.
Task preparation however does not typically eliminate
switch cost, leaving behind a ‘‘residual’’ switch cost. It has
been suggested that this residual switch cost can be
accounted for by processes that occur at the level of
response selection. In particular these processes may con-
tribute to inhibition of irrelevant but competing task sets,
which would be expected to interfere with and thus prolong
the selection of a response during a subsequent switch but
not repetition trial, producing a switch cost. That is,
response selection on one trial affects performance on the
next. This conclusion is supported by diminished switch
cost following trials in which response selection is absent.
For instance, Schuch and Koch (2003) measured switch
cost following no-go trials, in which a stimulus appeared
on screen but a signal instructed participants to withhold
their response, and found that switch cost was eliminated
on the trial immediately following. In subsequent studies
they and others have demonstrated that processes that
occur at the level of response-selection, independent
of motor execution or inhibition, are the critical factor
(Philipp, Jolicoeur, Falkenstein & Koch, 2007; Verbruggen,
Liefooghe, Szmalec & Vandierendonck, 2005; Verbruggen,
Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2006).
Independently measured, task preparation and response
selection provide a clear account of behavior control; task
rules that are made active in working memory either
facilitate or interfere with selection of responses during
target onset. However, when considered together, the
supporting ﬁndings are paradoxical. Speciﬁcally, whereas
the RISC effect observed on go trials suggests that task-set
preparation must have been effective in activating or rec-
onﬁguring the task, the complete absence of switch cost
following no-go trials suggests the opposite. If task prep-
aration and response-selection processes independently
contribute to switch cost then eliminating one should
eliminate only that component of the switch cost, not both
as observed by Schuch and Koch (2003). During no-go
trials, immediately following cue onset, participants are
still able to retrieve task rules and even though these are
never applied, their retrieval should interfere with sub-
sequent performance. In other words eliminating response
selection during no-go trials should eliminate residual
switch cost but not RISC. This is contrary to what was
observed.
One natural explanation for this paradox is that in this
paradigm participants did not in fact retrieve task rules
during preparation. If only processes occurring at the level
of response selection contributed to the switch cost then
only residual switch cost should be present. Accordingly,
eliminating such processes during no-go trials would be
expected to eliminate this switch cost, as observed. Con-
sistent with this explanation, in a further exploration of the
effects observed by Schuch and Koch (2003), Kleinsorge
and Gajewski (2004) demonstrated that as they increased
participants’ motivation to prepare, RISC effects were
increased across trial types. As such the degree to which
participants prepare, correlates with the magnitude of
subsequent RISC effect. This explanation however is
insufﬁcient to account for Schuch and Koch’s ﬁndings
because they, unlike Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004,
‘‘Neutral Context’’ condition), observed RISC following go
trials (e.g., Experiment 1a), suggesting that participants
engaged in task preparation. If participants were simply not
motivated to engage in task preparation then RISC should
have been absent following go trials as well as following
no-go trials.
Therefore Schuch and Koch’s (2003) ﬁndings present an
interesting puzzle. Why would participants appear to
engage in task preparation only following go trials? One
intriguing possibility is that processing of no-go trials has
the effect of interfering with task preparation. Such inter-
ference would be expected to selectively eliminate switch
cost following no-go stimuli, as observed. No-go trials
may, for instance, trigger a global inhibition signal (Aron
& Verbruggen, 2008; De Jong, Coles & Logan, 1995),
which has been hypothesized to occur whenever responses
need to be stopped quickly (Aron, 2007; Aron & Poldrack,
2006) such as during no-go trials. Beyond its effects on
motor responses, such a signal may be expected to also
inhibit task rules that are held in working memory. Another
possibility is that no-go stimuli reset, rather than inhibit,
working memory. For instance, no-go stimuli occur infre-
quently and are unrelated, in stimuli and responses, to the
primary task. As such they may trigger an increase in
vigilance that has the side effect of clearing working
memory. Indeed such ‘‘workspace ﬂushing’’ has been
proposed as a core mechanism that prevents control sys-
tems from perseverating on irrelevant response patterns
(Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Logan & Gordon, 2001). More
simply, no-go stimuli may also be perceived as a third task,
in which case all subsequent go trials would be equivalent
to switch trials.
1 Switch cost would not be expected in this
case, though responses should be slowed relative to repe-
tition trials. This is consistent with a general slowing of
responses following no-go trials relative to go trials (e.g.,
Kleinsorge & Gajewski, 2004; Schuch & Koch, 2003).
These possibilities clearly demonstrate that no-go trials
might have actively interfered with task preparation in
Schuch and Koch’s (2003) study, which would account for
the absence of RISC following these trials but not
1 We thank Frederick Verbruggen for pointing out this possibility.
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reveal effects of task preparation. Such a result would not
only help explain Schuch and Koch’s paradoxical result,
but would also imply that processes occurring at the level
of response selection can modulate the efﬁcacy of task
preparation. Namely, effects of task preparation can go
unnoticed. This hypothesis was the object of the present
study.
Current study
To examine the effect of no-go trials on task preparation, we
constructed a variant of the paradigm used by Schuch and
Koch (2003, Experiment 1a). Following Schuch and Koch,
our participants alternated between number judgments (Is a
number odd or even? Is a number greater or lesser than 5?)
that were indicated by a cue that preceded each target
stimulus. In Experiment 1, a neutral stimulus (@, #, %, !, &)
that was not associated with any response was presented on
25% of all trials. During these no-go trials, response
selection was absent and therefore any switch cost observed
following such trials could only be produced by effects of
task preparation during the no-go trial. In Schuch and
Koch’s study, no such costs were observed. Experiment 1
aimed to replicate this result while controlling for a
potentially important confound in Schuch and Koch’s ori-
ginal design. Looking ahead brieﬂy, this replication was
successful. Experiment 2 therefore investigated further the
effect of no-go stimuli on task switching, speciﬁcally to test
whether the presentation of no-go stimuli might actually
interfere with task preparation. To this end, we removed no-
go stimuli, transforming no-go trials into ‘‘cue-only’’ trials
in which task cues were followed by a blank cue–stimulus
interval before the cue for the next trial appeared. We
predicted that if no-go stimuli interfere with task prepara-
tion, then reliable switch effects and RISC should be
observed following these critical cue-only trials.
Experiment 1
Before examining whether the no-go stimuli interfere with
task preparation we ﬁrst sought to optimize this paradigm
for its measurement. In Schuch and Koch’s (2003) original
design, the length of the cue–stimulus interval was constant
across trials within a block. Therefore, long (no-go) prep-
aration intervals were always followed by a long CSI on
the subsequent go trial, meaning that participants could
potentially ‘‘prepare away’’ any carried-over effects of
preparation from the prior trial. The most sensitive condi-
tion to evaluate such carry-over effects would be a long
(no-go) preparation interval followed by a short CSI on the
subsequent go trial, maximizing the effects of task-prepa-
ration during the no-go trials on performance during the go
trial. In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis by varying
the length of the cue–stimulus interval randomly across
trials within blocks. If in the original design the effects of
task preparation were prepared away due to blocking of
CSI, then randomly varying CSI within a block should
produce a signiﬁcant switch cost for long CSI no-go trials
following a short CSI go trial.
Method
Participants
20 participants were tested (11 females, M = 20.0 years
old). Participants were recruited across the Princeton
University Campus and were paid $10 US or received class
credit. This study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at Princeton University. All subjects provided
written, informed consent prior to participation.
Task and stimuli
Participants were presented with single-digit stimuli and
were required to make number judgments of either parity
(odd–even) or magnitude (higher–lower than 5), depending
on a task cue (Fig. 1). All stimuli were presented in white
on a black background. Task cues included square and
diamond frames, 4.5 cm
2 (5.2 of visual angle), respec-
tively cuing parity and magnitude. This assignment
was kept constant across participants and manipulations.
Fig. 1 In the present study participants alternated between two
number judgments (parity and magnitude), that were indicated by a
preceding task cue. The trial sequence contained 75% go trials during
which a response was required (second trial in each trial pair above),
and 25% non-response trials (no-go in Experiment 1 and cue-only
trials in Experiment 2). During no-go trials the stimulus was neutral
(e.g., #). During cue-only trials there was no stimulus presented
between consecutive cues. Switch cost was measured on go trials as a
function of preceding trial (go, cue-only, no-go), as well as
preparation interval (CSI cue–stimulus interval, CCI cue–cue interval)
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Numbers measured 1 cm in height, 0.3 cm in width
(Courier New, 28 point, Bold), subtending 1.2 of visual
angle vertically. Both task cues and number stimuli were
presented centrally on the screen. The no-go stimuli were
neutral characters (@, #, %, !, &) that did not have a
corresponding magnitude or parity responses. Left and
right arrow responses on a standard keyboard were used for
both tasks, producing equal numbers of response–congru-
ent and response–incongruent stimuli.
Design
We used a within-subject 2 9 2 9 2 9 2 design. The ﬁrst
three factors were trial type (SWITCH, switch vs. repeat),
previous trial go status (prevGO, go vs. no-go on the pre-
vious trial), and cue–stimulus interval (CSI: 350 ms vs.
1,250 ms). CSI was manipulated across trials. The fourth
variable of interest was previous-trial CSI (prevCSI,
350 ms vs. 1,250 ms). Only go trials were analyzed as no
responses were collected for no-go trials, and successive
no-go trials were disallowed. The response–stimulus
interval (RSI) was kept constant at 1,850 ms by varying the
response–cue interval (RCI, 1,500 ms vs. 600 ms) to
complement each CSI. Response mappings were counter-
balanced across subjects.
Task sequences were constructed randomly within the
following constraints (as per Schuch & Koch, 2003, Experi-
ment 1a). No-go trials occurred on 25% of all trials with at
least one go-trial between no-go trials. The target stimulus
fortrialnwasalwaysdifferentthanfortrialn – 1andforthe
last occurrence of the same task. The sequence contained
approximately equivalent number of response repeats and
shiftsfortrialnrelativetoresponsesfortrialn – 1andn –2 .
The complete sequence of 768 trials was divided into eight
blocks of 96 trials. Within each block there were 48 trials of
each task, of which 24 were switch trials and 24 were repeat
trials.Foreach24,sixwereno-gotrialsand18weregotrials.
The ﬁrst trial of each block was always a go trial.
Procedure
The task procedure and parameters are illustrated in Fig. 1.
A trial started with the presentation of a cue (i.e., diamond
or square frame) presented for 250 ms. The cue was
replaced by a blank screen for either 100 or 1,000 ms. The
blank screen was used to ensure that participants process
and internally represent the cue; if the cue remained on
screen it may facilitate performance during the target
without requiring task preparation (Verbruggen, Liefooghe,
Vandierendonck & Demanet, 2007). The CSI was either
350 or 1,250 ms. Following the cue and CSI, a number
stimulus was presented and remained on screen until a
response was made. On no-go trials the neutral stimulus
was displayed until either a button was pressed (errone-
ously) or until 1,000 ms elapsed.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible on go trials and to withhold
responses on no-go trials. Incorrect responses were
accompanied by feedback presented in red below the
number stimulus, stating ‘‘Wrong Key’’ or ‘‘Do not press
key’’ for go and no-go trials, respectively. Feedback was
presented for 500 ms. An appropriate RCI followed,
complementing the subsequent CSI in length for a con-
sistent RSI of 1,850 ms. The screen was blank during the
RCI. Subjects were encouraged to take breaks between
blocks. The entire session lasted approximately 60 min.
Results
Data analysis
The data were analyzed using a repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with error rate and RT as dependent
measures, and prevCSI, CSI, prevGO and SWITCH as
independent variables. The ﬁrst two trials of each block
were excluded. Only trials preceded by two correct trials
and for which RT was below 2,000 ms were retained. On
average across subjects, we excluded 8% of all trials
(SD = 0.06). Only effects that showed at least a trend
effect (p\0.1) are reported.
RT data
As shown in Fig. 2, there was a main effect of SWITCH,
F(1,19) = 27.99, p\0.01, that interacted with prevGO,
F(1,19) = 19.58, p\0.01. That is, there was a signiﬁcant
overall switch cost (repeat 761 ms vs. switch 810 ms) that
was greater following go trials (80 ms) than following no-
go trials (18 ms). Subsequent pairwise comparisons
revealed that the switch cost was signiﬁcant following go
trials, (79 ms), t(19) = 7.36, p\0.001 (one-tailed), but
was a trend following no-go trials, (17 ms), t(19) = 1.42,
p\0.09 (one-tailed). A planned comparison was con-
ducted for the critical no-go/go sequence in which a long
preparation period on the no-go trial was followed by a
short preparation interval for the go trial (1,250/350 CSI).
This analysis revealed that the observed 23 ms switch cost
was not signiﬁcantly different from zero, t\1.
The overall effect of RISC showed only a trend,
SWITCH 9 CSI, F(1,19) = 2.45, p = 0.13. As is evident
from Fig. 2, switch cost appeared to decrease with a longer
CSI following go trials (100 ms vs. 58 ms) but less so
following no-go trials (20 ms vs. 15 ms). Although the
three-way interaction with prevGO was not reliable,
F(1,19) = 1.15, p = 0.24, we repeated these analyses
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the protocol of Schuch and Koch (2003) who reported a
reliable RISC effect following go trials but not following
no-go trials when analyzed separately.
2 Indeed, the inter-
action between CSI and SWITCH was signiﬁcant after go
trials, F(1,19) = 6.77, p = 0.02 but not after no-go trials,
F\1. Therefore, switch cost was signiﬁcant and showed a
RISC effect after go trials but not after no-go trials.
Finally, there was also a main effect of CSI,
F(1,19) = 93.35, p\0.01, with mean RT faster for trials
with a long CSI (727 ms) than with a short CSI (844 ms),
indicating that RT beneﬁted from the preparation interval.
An additional interaction, GO 9 SWITCH, F(1,19) =
19.58, p\0.001, reﬂecteda slowing of RT following no-go
trials (784 ms) relative to go trials (739 ms) during task
repetitions, but not during task alternations (801 ms vs.
818 ms). No other effects were signiﬁcant.
Error rate
The overall error rate was 7% (SD = 0.01). The main
effects paralleled those for RT. The main effect of
SWITCH showed a trend, F(1,19) = 4.07, p = 0.06, and
interacted with prevGO, F(1,19) = 4.83, p = 0.03. These
effects reﬂected a trend switch cost (repeat 6% vs. switch
7.5%) that was greater following go trials (2.8%) than
following no-go trials (0.3%). The overall effect of RISC
also showed a trend, SWITCH 9 CSI, F(1,19) = 3.75,
p = 0.07. Switch cost decreased with CSI (2.6% vs. 0.3%).
No other effects were signiﬁcant.
In contrast to the RT data, there was no main effect
of CSI on error rates, F\1. Rather there was a unique
three-way interaction between SWITCH, prevGO, and
prevCSI, F(1,19) = 4.56, p = 0.05. This interaction
occurred because prevCSI had different effects on
switch cost following no-go versus go trials. Switch
cost following no-go trials increased with longer
prevCSI (-1.3% vs. 1.8%), whereas switch cost
following go trials was comparable across prevCSI
(2.9% vs. 2.5%). Further post hoc comparisons were not
conducted.
Discussion
The results of this experiment were similar to those of
Schuch and Koch (2003) with respect to switch cost, ruling
out the possibility that their results were caused by a
confound between current and previous CSI present in their
blocked-CSI design. Thus, replicating Schuch and Koch’s
earlier ﬁndings, we found that switch costs and RISC were
reliable only after go trials, independent of CSI on the prior
trial (though we caution that, as in the original study, the
three-way interaction between SWITCH, prevGO and
prevCSI was not reliable). Importantly, switch cost was
also absent in the critical condition in which a long CSI
(prepared-for) no-go trial was followed by a short CSI
(unprepared) go trial, the condition that should be optimal
for observing any interfering effects of prior preparation
for an alternative task. Rather, eliminating response
selection via no-go stimuli appeared to attenuate sub-
sequent switch cost. Performance during go trials revealed
a reduction as CSI increased—that is, there was a reliable
RISC effect—suggesting that cue processing contributed to
switch cost.
Collectively, these results rule out the possibility that in
the original paradigm task preparation was ineffectively
measured due to blocking of CSI. In Experiment 2
we therefore addressed the main question of this study,
whetherno-gotrialstendtodisruptongoingtaskperformance
in such a way as to obscure effects of prior preparation that
might otherwise be observed.
Fig. 2 Mean reaction time (RT, lines) and switch cost (bars) for
Experiment 1. Data are shown for go trials following go (black) and
no-go (grey) trials, for switch (squares) and repeat (circles) trials.
Switch cost and RISC were signiﬁcant following go trials. Switch cost
was not signiﬁcant following no-go trials. No effects of prevCSI were
observed (top vs. bottom graph)
2 The three-way interaction also was not signiﬁcant in the Schuch
and Koch (2003, Experiment 1a) study.
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If no-go trials interfered with the effects of task preparation
in Experiment 1 (and in the study by Schuch & Koch,
2003), then this effect (e.g., a global inhibition signal)
would be expected to occur in response to the no-go
stimulus. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we sought to elimi-
nate such interference by removing the no-go stimulus. To
do this, we replaced no-go trials with ‘‘cue-only’’ trials that
did not include any stimulus following the cue. Rather a
cue and appropriate CSI were immediately followed by a
cue for the subsequent trial. The CSI was effectively
converted to a cue–cue interval (CCI). In this way we
aimed to eliminate any potential interference that the no-go
stimulus may have produced on task preparation. If such
interference was present in Experiment 1 then removal
of the no-go stimuli should reveal a reliable switch cost
following cue-only trials in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants
We tested 21 participants (9 females, M = 19.4 years old).
Stimuli, design, procedure
Stimuli and design were identical to Experiment 1 except
that no neutral stimulus appeared on no-go trials (Fig. 1,
right-hand sequence). Instead, on cue-only trials a cue was
presented for 250 ms followed by an interval of either 100
or 1,000 ms. The screen remained blank during this time.




Data were screened and analyzed as in Experiment 1, with
no-go trials replaced by cue-only trials. For consistency
across experiments we retain the use of the terms CSI and
prevCSI, although in reference to cue-only trials these
terms actually refer to CCI. On average 8% of all trials
were excluded from analysis (SD = 0.05).
RT data
As in Experiment 1 there was a main effect of SWITCH,
F(1,20) = 75.3, p\0.001, but unlike Experiment 1
SWITCH did not interact with prevGO, F\1. As shown
in Fig. 3 there was an overall switch cost (repeat trials
726 ms vs. switch trials 785 ms) that was signiﬁcant
following both go trials (59 ms), t(20) = 5.8, p\0.001,
and cue-only trials (58 ms), t(20) = 7.7, p\0.001.
Indeed, switch cost in the critical CSI condition (1,250/350
CSI) was greater following cue-only trials (113 ms) than
following go trials (63 ms). The four-way interaction,
SWITCH 9 prevGO 9 CSI 9 prevCSI, was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(1,20) = 1.29, p = 0.27. These results suggest that
switch cost can be observed in the absence of response
selection (i.e., following cue-only trials), contrary to the
conclusions of Schuch and Koch (2003).
There was also an effect of RISC, namely the
SWITCH 9 CSI interaction was signiﬁcant, F(1,20) =
6.9, p = 0.02, indicating that switch cost was greater with
a short CSI (82 ms) than with a long CSI (35 ms). Inter-
estingly this RISC effect interacted with trial type (prev-
GO), F(1,20) = 4.69, p = 0.04. A paired t test analysis
on mean switch cost revealed a reliable RISC after
cue-only trials (94 ms vs. 22 ms), t(20) = 2.95, p\0.01
Fig. 3 Mean reaction time (RT, lines) and switch cost (bars) for
Experiment 2, with no-go replaced by cue-only trials. Data are shown
for go trials following go (black) and cue-only (grey) trials, for switch
(squares) and repeat (circles) trials. Switch cost and RISC were now
signiﬁcant across trial types, and the effect was larger following cue-
only trials than following go trials. RT was overall faster following
cue-only trials (also see Fig. 4)
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49 ms), t(20) = 1.23, p = 0.13 (one-tailed). Therefore,
RISC was actually reduced following go trials relative to
Experiment 1. This ﬁnding will be revisited below in the
context of between-subject effects (cf., Experiment
Effects).
Finally, as in Experiment 1, we found a signiﬁcant main
effect of CSI, F(1,20) = 65.8, p\0.001. Participants
showed an RT beneﬁt from longer CSI (693 ms vs.
818 ms). Additionally we found a main effect of prevGO,
F(1,20) = 27.7, p\0.001, which indicated that partici-
pants were faster to respond after cue-only trials (719 ms
vs. 791 ms). This ﬁnding is notable and will also be con-
sidered in the between-subject effects analysis below. No
other effects were signiﬁcant.
Error rate
Average error rate was 9% (SD = 0.09) and the main
effects, again, paralleled those in RT data. As in Experi-
ment 1, the main effect of SWITCH showed a trend,
F(1,20) = 4.12, p = 0.06. Switch trials showed slightly
more errors than repeat trials (9.9% vs. 8.5%) indicating
that the switch cost was in the expected direction. There
was also a signiﬁcant interaction between SWITCH and
prevGO, F(1,20) = 6.6, p = 0.02, with switch costs
greater following go trials than following cue-only trials
(3.1% vs. 0.02%). The effect of RISC was however not
signiﬁcant, F(1,20) = 2.27, p = 0.15.
The lack of a switch cost following cue-only trials
(0.02%), t\1, contrasted with the RT results (above).
However, it is important to note that the switch cost
following cue-only trials was zero, but not negative, which
would have suggested that a speed-accuracy trade-off
could account for the switch cost in RT. The mean switch
cost in our condition of interest (1,250/350 CSI), which
showed the greatest RT switch cost (113 ms), was 1.1%,
also not signiﬁcantly different from zero, t\1 but, again,
not negative.
Finally, accuracy was also higher following cue-only
versus go trials, F(1,20) = 6.73, p = 0.02 (91.5% vs.
90.0%) which, consistent with RT results (above),
suggests an overall beneﬁt in performance for trials
following cue-only trials. This ﬁnding is discussed in the
next section.
Experiment effects
Both RT and error rate analyses revealed that performance
was overall better following cue-only trials than following
go trials, which was not the case for no-go trials in
Experiment 1. We wondered whether a different strategy
between experiments could explain the attenuation of RISC
following go trials. In particular, the omission of no-go
stimuli during cue-only trials meant that subsequent cues
on these trials were presented at a faster rate then during go
trials. A faster pace may speed up responses following such
trials (Bertelson, 1961), which may in turn have the side
effect of decreasing attention during standard go trials. The
consequence would be poorer performance following go
trials, potentially attenuating RISC.
We evaluated this possibility by comparing performance
across experiments. We conducted a mixed factorial
ANOVA separately for error rate and RT. Two within-
subject factors were included, prevGO and SWITCH. The
latter was included because repeat trials are known to
contribute to cue priming effects (Logan & Bundesen,
2003; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003), which would be particularly
potent on cue-only trials. Signiﬁcant interactions with the
between-group EXPERIMENT variable were of interest
and are shown in Fig. 4.
For the RT data, EXPERIMENT interacted with prev-
GO, F(1,39) = 26.19, p\0.01, and these variables further
showed a signiﬁcant three-way interaction with SWITCH,
Fig. 4 Mean reaction time (RT, top) and error rate (bottom) for
Experiments 1 and 2, shown following go (black) and no-go/cue-only
(grey) trials. The difference between switch (hatched) and repeat
(solid) trials clearly shows a switch cost in both RT and error rate
following go trials. Following no-go/cue-only trials this effect is
absent in error rate, and is present only following cue-only trials in
RT. Notably, with removal of no-go stimuli (Experiment 2) RT
decreased following cue-only trials and error rate increased following
go trials
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that RT was on average faster in Experiment 2 than in
Experiment 1 following no-go/cue-only trials (719 ms vs.
793 ms), t(39) = 1.79, p = 0.09 (one-tailed), but not
following go trials (791 ms vs. 778 ms), t\1. Second this
effect was most pronounced for repetition trials (see
Fig. 4). Repetition trial responses were signiﬁcantly faster
following cue-only trials in Experiment 2 than following
no-go trials in Experiment 1 (690 ms vs. 785 ms),
t(39) = 1.91, p = 0.03 (one-tailed). In other words, as
expected, removing stimuli from the no-go trials that were
used in Experiment 1 increased response speed following
the corresponding cue-only trials in Experiment 2.
For error rates, EXPERIMENT interacted only with
prevGO, F(1,39) = 6.39, p = 0.02. As shown in Fig. 4,
following go trials error rate increased from Experiment 1
(6.5%) to Experiment 2 (10%), t(39) = 1.87, p = 0.02
(one-tailed), but showed no signiﬁcant change from no-go
trials (7%) to cue-only trials (8.5%), t\1. Therefore,
removing stimuli from the no-go trials that were used in
Experiment 1 increased the error rate selectively follow-
ing go trials in Experiment 2. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that cue only trials in Experiment 2
hindered performance following go trials, which may
have in turn attenuated switch costs following go trials in
Experiment 2.
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we found that removing no-go stimuli
revealed an effect of task preparation that occurred during
cue-only trials on performance during subsequent go trials.
Switch cost and RISC were now reliable following cue-
only trials. This ﬁnding suggests that switch costs and
RISC can occur without response selection, presumably
reﬂecting the inﬂuence of prior task preparation, and that
the no-go stimuli in Experiment 1 may have interfered with
such preparatory effects.
A potential concern with our ﬁndings is that removing
no-go stimuli (and the response–stimulus interval) in
Experiment 2 effectively shortened the time between
consecutive cues relative to no-go trials in Experiment 1.
Perhaps switch cost emerged because we limited decay of
task processing effects between consecutive cues relative
to Experiment 1, not because we removed interfering no-go
stimuli. However, in other studies in our laboratory we
have found that a signiﬁcant switch cost following cue-
only trials may be observed for cue–cue intervals of
2,600 ms (Lenartowicz & Cohen, 2006) and up to
4,000 ms (unpublished results). Therefore, it is unlikely
that decay alone can account for the absence of a switch
cost in Experiment 1, which had a maximum cue–cue
interval of 2,650 ms.
General discussion
The aim of this study was to evaluate whether no-go
stimuli interfere with task preparation, thereby modulating
preparatory effects on switch cost during subsequent trials.
We ﬁrst showed that the absence of switch costs in a no-go
paradigm is not an artifact of the use of blocked CSIs, and
then demonstrated that both switch cost and RISC were
signiﬁcant when no-go stimuli were replaced with cue-only
trials. This ﬁnding provides evidence that, independent of
their effects on response selection, no-go stimuli can
interfere with the effects of task preparation. In the
remainder of this discussion, we consider the mechanisms
by which this interference may occur and the implications
of our ﬁndings for studying task preparation.
No-go stimuli and mechanisms of interference
Two plausible mechanisms by which no-go stimuli may
interfere with task preparation are inhibition and task
reset. The ﬁrst possibility is that no-go stimuli are inter-
preted as a stop signal. If so they may be expected to
elicit inhibition of the motor response as well as inhibi-
tion of recently retrieved task rules. Such a global, non-
speciﬁc inhibition mechanism has been proposed to
operate when responses need to be stopped quickly (Aron
& Verbruggen, 2008; Coxon, Stinear & Byblow, 2007;
De Jong, Coles & Logan, 1995; Verbruggen, Liefooghe &
Vandierendonck, 2006), as may be expected with the
occurrence of no-go stimuli. One assumption of this
hypothesis is that inhibition at the level of motor
responses can spread to representations of task rules. This
assumption is not implausible. Spread of inhibition is well
documented as a contributing factor in retrieval induced
forgetting (Anderson & Neely, 1996; Norman, Newman
& Detre, 2007) and in transfer effects within negative
priming (Tipper & Driver, 1988; Tipper, MacQueen &
Brehaut, 1988). A similar cascade may be initiated by no-
go stimuli, with inhibition spreading from motor to rule
representations. However, motor inhibition does not
automatically spread to rule representations and so it may
not necessarily be a factor in the current study. Logan
(1983, 1985) showed that stop-signal generated inhibition
of motor responses had no effect on the recall of word-
pairs associated with that response, counter to the idea of
spreading inhibition. The variables that determine whether
inhibition spread occurs, and thus whether it was present
in our experiment, are unclear. However, one prediction
of the inhibition hypothesis is that if task rules were
inhibited then the activation level of the task-rule repre-
sentation should be below baseline. If so, then responses
on a subsequent task repetition should be slowed relative
to a task switch. The result would be an inverse switch
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inhibition (Koch, Gade & Philipp, 2004; Mayr & Keele,
2000). As there was no such slowing following no-go
trials (Experiment 1), we suggest that task rules were not
inhibited following no-go trials in the current study.
An alternate mechanism by which no-go stimuli could
interfere with task preparation is by clearing rule repre-
sentations that were active in working memory. This could
occur because no-go stimuli are unrelated to the task itself
and/or because they require an interruption in task ﬂow.
Conceptually, this idea is similar to the ‘‘ﬂushing’’ of
response counters proposed by Logan and Gordon (2001)
in their model of executive control, which was suggested to
occur after each response in order to keep working memory
open to new inputs and thus prevent perseveration (see also
Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). No-go stimuli may have a
similar effect in our experiment, but ‘‘ﬂushing’’ all of
working memory rather than just response representations.
In this sense no-go stimuli may be perceived as a third task
that, because it shares no response mappings with others,
produces no interference and thus no inhibition (Botvinick,
Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; Gade & Koch,
2005). However, it does disrupt processing by clearing
working memory. Another potentially related effect of
disruption in task switching occurs whenever performance
is brieﬂy stopped. Comparing the ﬁrst trial of a task-
switching block to subsequent trials in that block reveals a
relative slowing, referred to as the ‘‘restart cost’’ (Allport &
Wylie, 2000; Gopher, Armony & Greenshpan, 2000). This
pause effect may be similar to that of no-go stimuli in that,
following both, activation of the relevant task representa-
tion must be rebuilt (Altmann & Gray, 2002; Poljac, Koch
& Bekkering, 2009). Consistent with this interpretation, a
general slowing has been observed following no-go trials
relative to following go trials (Kleinsorge & Gajewski,
2004; Koch & Philipp, 2005; Schuch & Koch, 2003). In the
current study such slowing was observed as well, though
primarily following repetition trials (Experiment 1). Based
on these observations we suggest that the most likely effect
of no-go trials is to clear working memory, and as a con-
sequence they eliminate effects of prior task preparation.
Implications for task preparation
Insofar as they may obscure the effects of task preparation,
no-go stimuli have direct impact on interpretations
regarding the occurrence and scope of preparatory pro-
cesses. For instance, in Experiment 1, an absence of switch
cost following no-go stimuli may be interpreted as evi-
dence that task preparation contributed little if anything to
switch cost beyond the effects of response selection.
However, such a conclusion would be incorrect because, in
Experiment 2, we saw that preparation for cue-only trials
clearly modulated subsequent switch cost.
Of perhaps greater signiﬁcance is whether our result can
inform the scope of preparatory processes. In particular, the
notion that task preparation involves retrieval of task rules
(Allport & Wylie, 1999; de Jong, 2000; Gilbert & Shallice,
2002; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Meiran, 1996; Monsell, 1996;
Rubinstein, Meyer & Evans, 2001; Sohn & Anderson,
2001; Yeung & Monsell, 2003) has been questioned by the
observation that RISC effects may reﬂect priming of visual
encoding of the cue, rather than active preparation of the
cued task (Logan & Bundesen, 2003, 2004; Logan &
Schneider, 2006). Thus, far we have been agnostic
regarding these possibilities, however, our results may be
interpreted as evidence for the task-rule retrieval account.
Cue priming effects should be most pronounced during
short CSI sequences because these trials present the
greatest challenge to cue encoding. Accordingly, the
greatest switch cost may be expected following cue-only
trials in 350/350 CSI-sequences. However, in Experiment 2
(Fig. 3) we found that switch cost following the 1,250/350
CSI-sequence cue-only trials (113 ms) was about 50%
greater than following the 350/350 CSI-sequence cue-only
trials (75 ms). Though this difference was only a trend,
t(20) = 1.18, p = 0.13, it may suggest that participants
engaged in more than cue encoding during the cue-only
trials.
Of course this conclusion is based on the assumption
that cues were completely encoded within the 350 ms
CSI. This assumption may not be appropriate for abstract
cues such as those used in our study (Logan & Bundesen,
2004). Stronger evidence would be to show a reliable
switch cost, whilst controlling for cue priming. Brass and
von Cramon (2004) did exactly that by using multiple
cues in a cue-only paradigm similar to that used in the
current study. Even with cue priming effects eliminated,
they also found a signiﬁcant switch cost following cue
only trials. We also have evaluated switch cost in this
paradigm with cue repetitions removed (Lenartowicz &
Cohen, 2006) and found switch cost to be signiﬁcant
following cue only trials. Perhaps even more convincing
is the ﬁnding of Kleinsorge and Gajewski (2004) who
demonstrated measurable switch cost and RISC following
no-go trials when the probability of a subsequent task
repetition was increased to 80%. Apparently, with sufﬁ-
cient motivation, the interfering effects of no-go stimuli
can be overcome, implying an active process such as task-
set retrieval rather than passive visual priming of cue
encoding. Considering these ﬁndings, we suggest that
switch cost following cue-only trials may be particularly
sensitive to the effects of task preparation, and thus task-
rule retrieval when it exists.
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123Conclusion
The present study demonstrates that no-go trials can
interfere with the effects of task-preparation on switch cost,
thus accounting for the absence of switch cost following
no-go trials in Schuch and Koch’s (2003) study. Although
the speciﬁc mechanism behind this interference is still to be
determined, its presence demonstrates that processes at the
level of response selection can modulate the efﬁcacy of
task preparation.
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